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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection-Pre-trial Detainees Must Be Held Under the Least Re-
strictive Means Possible to Assure the Detainees' Presence at
Trial. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, opinion supplemented,
377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
Plaintiffs,' detainees at the Manhattan House of Detention for
Men (MHD), more commonly known as the "Tombs,"2 brought suit
for declaratory and injunctive relief' against the Commissioner of
1. Plaintiffs named in this action, James Rhem, Robert Freely, Leo
Robinson, and Eugene Nixon, are no longer being detained at the Tombs.
Plaintiff Robinson was held nine months in the Tombs and then acquitted.
Interview with Steven A. Herman, Attorney for the Legal Aid Society
Prisoners' Rights Project, in New York City, Oct. 21, 1974.
2. The facility, a 12-story jail located at 125 White Street in Manhat-
tan, is the third in a line of city prisons in the area. The first, from which
the nickname "Tombs" is derived, was built in 1838. The second, located
across the street from the present building, was completed in 1902. The
conditions there were intolerable almost from the beginning. When the
present building was opened in 1941 it drew wide praise from assembled
officials. Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia stated: "We should be able to
streamline criminal justice as we have streamlined this building. . . .I'm
certain that 48 years from now this building will be in existence and in good
condition." N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1974, at 43, cols. 1-2.
3. Litigation, which dates back four years, was commenced as a class
action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). The United States Supreme Court held, in Wilword-
ing v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), 'and 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970), give United States district courts jurisdiction to
hear a state prisoner's application for injunctive relief against allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. 404 U.S. at 251-52. In order to
sue under section 1983, a plaintiff must show deprivation under color of
law of a right or privilege secured by laws of the United States or the
Constitution. Since no federal law guarantees rights to state prisoners, no
relief can be rendered unless constitutional issues are involved.
Project-Judicial Intervention in Corrections: The California Experi-
ence-An Empirical Study, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 452, 529 n.311 (1973). This
would apply to detainees in local detention centers as well. See Collins v.
Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 264 (D. Md. 1972). For a discussion of the
various remedies available to prisoners, see Singer, Enforcing the Constitu-
tional Rights of Prisoners, 17 How. L.J. 823, 825 (1973).
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Corrections of the City of New York, the warden, the mayor, and
various state officials.' Plaintiffs alleged that the conditions of their
detention constituted a denial of their rights under the first, fifth,
sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments.5 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York found unconstitu-
tional conditions did exist' and ordered the city to submit a plan
within thirty days to remedy the constitutional infirmities.7 Six
4. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, opinion supplemented, 377 F.
Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974). Those named in
the suit included Peter Preiser, Commissioner of Corrections of the State
of New York, Governor Malcolm Wilson, and Owen McGivern, Presiding
Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, individually and in their official capacities, none of whom
were involved in the appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. 507 F.2d at 335 n.3.
5. 371 F. Supp. at 597. The conditions complained of included "exces-
sive imposition of maximum security conditions, limitations on visiting
rights, the right to exercise and recreation; the lack of a 'tolerable living
environment' caused by excessive heat and noise, insufficient ventilation
and inability to see out of the building; the refusal to give an inmate the
option to be locked in his cell rather than in a -common area; inadequate
disciplinary procedures; and interference with correspondence rights and
the right to receive publications." 377 F. Supp. at 996. Certain others,
including overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and inadequate medical
care, were settled according to a stipulation in a consent decree entered
on August 2, 1973. 371 F. Supp. at 597. For a discussion of the conditions
of pre-trial detention in New York City, as well as a discussion of the
Tombs Riots of 1970, see Note, Pre-trial Detention in the New York City
Jails, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBLEMS 350 (1971).
6. 371 F. Supp. at 636.
7. 377 F. Supp. at 997. The original opinion of January 7, 1974 in-
structed the parties "to prepare for a conference to determine the contents
of an order consistent with this opinion." 371 F. Supp. at 637. At this
conference, held on January 18, 1974, plaintiffs submitted a proposed judg-
ment that the city present within 30 days a "comprehensive and detailed
plan for elimination of the conditions which the court found to be unconsti-
tutional, as well as for immediate entry of final judgment on the questions
of correspondence, receipt of publications, disciplinary procedures, visiting
schedules and 'optional lockout.'" 377 F. Supp. at 997. Over the city's
protests, this proposed judgment became the substance of the court's deci-
sion, entered March 22, 1974, which made specific provisions concerning
inmate correspondence, receipt of publications and disciplinary proce-
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months later, the city had failed to produce either a plan or the
money required to effectuate necessary changes.' The district court,
in a supplementary opinion,9 held that unless such a plan were
submitted by the city within thirty days the Tombs would be
closed. 0 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed" as
to the finding of unconstitutionality, but stayed the order closing
the Tombs and remanded for further consideration of the remedy. 13
dures, set a date for a further evidentary hearing as to arrangements for
contact visits, and as to other issues ordered the submission of the afore-
mentioned plan-within 30 days. Id.
8. 377 F. Supp. at 998-99. The March 22 judgment required that the
plan be submitted by April 21, 1974. On April 22, over plaintiffs' objec-
tions, the city was granted an extension to April 29. On that date the city
submitted a plan which the court adjudged deficient concerning contact
visits, exercise and recreation, provision of adequate ventilation and light,
and elimination of noise. The plan also revealed that the city was consider-
ing the possibility of closing the Tombs. On May 14 the court directed the
city to submit within one week a statement of: 1) the city's position con-
cerning the closing of the Tombs; and 2) when a final decision would be
reached. The city replied that a final decision would be given on June 15.
On May 29 the court ordered the city to submit specific plans for renovat-
ing the Tombs consistent with the court's opinion of March 22. In response,
the city, on June 10, indicated that while funding had been approved for
renovation of the fifth and eighth floors (as required in the consent decree),
none had been approved for contact visit facilities, improving the heating
and ventilation system, lessening the noise level or renovation of the base-
ment and tenth floors, all of which were necessary to implement the March
22 opinion. On June 19 the city indicated that it had determined to con-
tinue operating the Tombs but that it would not submit the comprehensive
and detailed plan required by the court. Again, on June 24 the city, in
response to a court order, indicated that it was unable to provide a time-
table as to when work on areas such as heating and ventilation, noise
reduction, and facilities for contact visits (all factors which the court
deemed significant in its original opinion) would commence. Id. at 997-98.
9. 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
10. Id. at 1000.
11. 507 F.2d at 336.
12. Id. at 335. The district court denied a stay pending appeal, but did,
however, stay its order until the city had an opportunity to apply to the
circuit court for a stay pending appeal. Brief for Appellant at 5, Rhem v.
Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974). The circuit court granted the stay
pending appeal on condition that the city "honor requests to transfer to
New York City House of Detention for Men at Rikers Island or other
1975]
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Shortly after the decision, the city made the question of appropriate
remedy moot by deciding to close the Tombs and shift its popula-
tion to the city institution at Rikers Island. 4
Until recently, courts followed a "hands off"' policy with respect
to prison reform. 5 Prison problems were regarded as essentially
available facility, at the discretion of the Commissioner of the Department
of Correction, of inmates of the Manhattan House of Detention for Men
who have been heretofore or who hereafter will have been detained 40 days
or.who hereafter are detained for 14 days." Id. at 5. Those not afforded this
option included those currently on trial, held for mental observation, or
determined to be escape risks. Id.
13. 507 F.2d at 336.
14. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1974, at 23, col. 4. Plans to close the 33 year-
old facility on White and Centre Streets in downtown Manhattan by the
end of 1974 were disclosed by New York City Commissioner of Corrections
Benjamin J. Malcolm. Commissioner Malcolm stated that the Tombs was
being closed for administrative reasons, but Stanley Buchsbaum, First
Assistant Corporation Counsel, indicated that the decision was the direct
result of the circuit court's ruling. Agenor Castro, spokesman for the De-
partment of Corrections, listed three possible alternatives for the Tombs:
1) strip the building and close it down; 2) close it temporarily to make
major renovations; or 3) end use of the Tombs as a detention facility but
continue its laundry and restaurant for the benefit of other city institu-
tions. At the time of the city's decision to close the Tombs, 492 inmates
were confined there. Of this figure, 398 detainees were to be sent to the
New York City House of Detention for Men on Rikers Island, which can
hold more than 1300 persons. The rest, convicted inmates, were to be
transferred to the correctional institution for men on Rikers Island. Id.
The New York County Lawyers' Association's Special Committee on Penal
and Correctional Reform, in a letter to Mayor Beame, criticized the city's
decision to close the Tombs. The Committee urged him to keep the facility
open for those on trial and those whose presence is required in court, even
though increased costs to the city would result. Any other decision was
characterized as "so objectionable" as to be "unthinkable." 172 N.Y.L.J.
1, col. 6, (Dec. 10, 1974).
15. For a discussion of the "hands off" doctrine, see Note, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints
of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963), where it was stated that the primary
reason courts refused to review internal prison administration was the
"assertion repeatedly made that judicial review of such administrative
decisions will subvert the authority of prison officials, the discipline of the
prisons, and the efforts of prison administrators to accomplish the objec-
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administrative and, as such, beyond the scope of judicial scrunity.
Separation of powers required judicial non-involvement.
In time, however, the "hands off" doctrine began to erode'" as
courts found ways of justifying their involvement, particularly
where constitutional" or statutory rights"8 were concerned. While
prison conditions or practices which made life unpleasant for prison-
ers did not warrant the intrusion of courts, 9 the denial of a constitu-
tives of the system which is entrusted to their care and management." Id.
at 509; see Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law,
110 U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962); Note, Judicial Intervention in Prison
Administration, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 178, 179-80 (1967), Courts often
avoided intervention in prison administration on procedural grounds. See
Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270 (1969). One
court stated: "The courts have no supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct
of various [penal] institutions .... " Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278
(8th Cir. 1951).
16. See Singer, Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 17
How. L.J. 823 (1973); Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial
Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv. 841 (1971). For a study of the effects
of judicial involvement in the California adult prison system, see
Project-Judicial Intervention in Corrections: The California Experi-
ence-An Empirical Study, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 452 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v.
Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328
F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp.
327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F.
Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
18. See, e.g., Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Sheriff, 391
Mich. 359, 216 N.W.2d 910 (1974) (failure of county officers to keep jail in
adequate repair pursuant to statute justified court intervention).
19. See, e.g., Hanvey v. Pinto, 441 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1971) (prisoner
may be confined in one section of a prison rather than another); Courtney
v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969) (impo-
sition of solitary confinement following prisoner's misconduct was not arbi-
trary); Wiltsie v. California Dep't of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515 (9th Cir.
1968) (officials may have power to destroy a prisoner's personal painting);
Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965) (not unconstitutional to fail
to return letters not allowed to be mailed out).
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tional right did justify judicial intervention. 0
Rhem v. Malcolm represents the furthest extension of this recent
trend toward judicial activism in prison reform. While other courts
have threatened to close institutions,2 Rhem is only the second
decision in which a court has actually ordered a prison closed. The
location of the Tombs in the center of a large metropolis also makes
the case unusual.
23
20. See cases cited note 17 supra. In Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972),
the Court commented per curiam: "Federal courts sit not to supervise
prisons but to enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including
prisoners." Id. at 321. State courts also have jurisdiction to grant relief,
Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 91, 280 A.2d 110,
113-14 (1971), but they have done so infrequently.
21. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
(interim order), final order entered, 358 F. Supp. 338, motion order
entered, 361 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1973), where it was "ordered, ad-
judged, and decreed that the Pulaski County Jail facility and its operation
must meet . . . [constitutional] requirements and standards . . . or de-
fendants shall cease and terminate the operation of said facility." 358 F.
Supp. at 347-48. The jail was subsequently brought up to constitutional
standards. 361 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1973). See also Holt v. Sarver, 309
F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), where
the court held that "[u]nless. conditions at the Penitentiary farms are
brought up to a level of constitutional tolerability, the farms can no longer
be used for the confinement of convicts." 309 F. Supp. at 383. Shortly
thereafter, money was appropriated for new buildings and needed im-
provements, and the court noted that substantial progress had been made.
442 F.2d at 309.
22. The other ruling was Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt,
360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974), where it was held, inter alia, that a 125 year-
old facility for housing both detainees and convicted prisoners had outlived
its usefulness and violated the constitutional rights of the detainees con-
fined there. Substantial relief was awarded, including an injunction
against the housing of detainees in the facility after three years from the
date of the opinion. 360 F. Supp. at 691.
23. 507 F.2d at 340. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360
F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 977 (1974), involved a jail located on Charles Street in downtown
Boston. There was, however, no question of making substantial physical
changes in the jail. Indeed, the court concluded "that constitutional re-
quirements cannot be satisfied without construction of a new jail . .. ."
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Rhem v. Malcolm concerned pre-trial detainees rather than con-
victed prisoners. 4 This was an important factor in the court's deci-
sion.2" But for his lack of money, the detainee would be free on bail."
Thus, whether or not someone is subjected to the conditions in the
Tombs generally depends upon his ability to raise bail. 7
The court of appeals noted that the purposes of bail and detention
are identical, i.e., to assure the accused's presence at trial. 8 Deten-
360 F. Supp. at 686-87. The City of Boston did not, however, plead fiscal
inability to construct a new jail.
24. Despite the fact that plaintiff class included "all the inmates of the
Tombs," Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the
circuit court noted that the Tombs is used to house a relatively small
number of convicted misdemeanants as well as pre-trial detainees, but
stated that "[t]he constitutional theory applicable to convicted prisoners
is sufficiently different from that discussed here to justify not regarding
them as part of the plaintiff class for purposes of this appeal." 507 F.2d at
336 n.5. However, the equal protection argument, see text accompanying
notes 46-47 infra, should apply to those convicted as well as those awaiting
trial.
25. 507 F.2d at 336-38. The entire due process argument, which is the
primary basis for the decision here, hinges upon the fact that plaintiffs
have not, as yet, been convicted of anything. See also Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d-
1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Brenneman v. Madigan,
343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal, 1972).
26. 507 F.2d at 336. This is true except in those cases where no bail is
set, such as where an accused is charged with a capital offense.
27. Id. Unlike bail, which is set at varying amounts for different alleged
offenses and for persons appearing to be greater risks, detention conditions
at the Tombs are the same for all held there. Everyone in the Tombs,
regardless of charge, is held under maximum security. 371 F. Supp. at 624.
The Legal Aid Society has sued to upset the bail system, alleging that
defendants in Manhattan who are unable to post bail and who are, there-
fore, detained, are convicted more frequently and receive harsher sentences
than defendants who are released pending trial. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1974,
at 45, col. 1.
28. 507 F.2d at 336-37. See also Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 190
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 685 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd,
494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Collins v.
Schoonfield, 344.F. Supp. 257, 265 (D. Md. 1972); Brenneman v. Madigan,
19751
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
tion merely serves as an alternative whenbail is impossible. 9 As
such, detention should be in the "least restrictive means"3 neces-
sary to assure the detainee's presence at trial without endangering
the security of the jail." Just as bail may be found excessive,3" so
too may the conditions of detention. 3
Detention, unlike imprisonment, is not punitive.3' The presump-
343 F. Supp. 128, 135-36 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp.
1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
29. 507 F.2d at 336-37. Detention is also required for an accused who
does not meet the standards for release on his own recognizance. See
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
30. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (in-
terim order), final order entered, 358 F. Supp. 338, motion order entered,
361 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
31. 507 F.2d at 336-37. See also Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93,
330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456
F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972), where it was stated that "[detainees] are not to
be subjected to any hardship except those absolutely requisite for the
purpose of confinement only, and they retain all the rights of an ordinary
citizen except the right to go and come as they please. . . ." 323 F. Supp.
at 100. In Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the
court held that "[p]re-trial detainees do not stand on the same footing
as convicted inmates . . . . [Slubjecting pre-trial detainees to restric-
tions and privations other than those which inhere in their confinement
itself or which are justified by compelling necessities of jail administration,
is a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id. at 142. See also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail
v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 685-86 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d
1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Collins v. Schoonfield,
344 F. Supp. 257, 265 (D. Md. 1972).
32. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1 (1951).
33. 507 F.2d at 336-39. While courts do not choose to directly analogize
from excessive bail to excessive detention, the implication is certainly
there. See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra. In fact, the test of exces-
siveness of bail is similar to that of unconstitutionality of detention; that
is, whether bail is set at a higher figure than is reasonably calculated to
insure that the accused will stand trial. White v. United States, 330 F.2d
811 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855 (1964); see Forest v. United
States, 203 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1953).
34. 507 F.2d at 338. See also Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972), where it was held that
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tion of innocence until proven guilty35 and the most basic notions
of due process" dictate that a detainee, untried and unconvicted,
should not be punished.3 7 Although not intentionally punitive, the
court reasoned that conditions of detention may constitute de facto
punishment 38 and deny due process.39
The Second Circuit in Rhem based its finding of unconstitu-
tionality on denial of both due process 0 and equal protection.' The
district court found that conditions at the Tombs were in excess of
those required to assure the detainees' presence at trial" and could
"[i]ncarceration after conviction is imposed to punish, to deter, and to
rehabilitate the convict. . . .Conversely, where incarceration is imposed
prior to conviction, deterrence, punishment, and retribution are not legiti-
mate functions of the incarcerating officials. Their role is but a temporary
holding operation, and their necessary freedom of action is concomitantly
diminished. . . .Punitive measures in such a context are out of harmony
with the presumption of innocence." Id. at 190 (citation omitted). In Ham-
ilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (interim order), final
order entered, 358 F. Supp. 338, motion order entered, 361 F. Supp. 1235
(E.D. Ark. 1973), the court reasoned: "It is clear that the conditions for
pre-trial detention must not only be equal to, but superior to, those permit-
ted for prisoners serving sentences for the crimes they have committed
against society." Id. at 1191. In fact, detainees should not even be referred
to as "prisoners," concerning the usual connotation of the term. Id.
35. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
36. "Due process is a pervasive concept which embodies, even in its
most rudimentary form, the notion of fundamental fairness whenever gov-
ernmental action may result . . . in grievous loss to the individual."
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 137 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961).
37. 507 F.2d at 336-38.
38. Id. at 338. See also Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 137-
38 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1193 (E.D. Ark.
1971) (interim order), final order entered, 358 F. Supp. 338, motion order
entered, 361 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.
Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d
854 (6th Cir. 1972).
39. 507 F.2d at 338.
40. See text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
42. The city alleged that any deprivation which an inmate must face
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not be justified by security needs.43 It therefore concluded that the
conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment, which violated due process." This determination was found
free of error on appeal."
The district court also determined that conditions in New York
State penal institutions for convicted criminals and conditions in
other federal and municipal detention centers for detainees were far
superior to conditions in the Tombs.46 As a result, the circuit court
found a violation of equal protection.47
Arguably the equal protection clause would be relevant to any
case where the conditions of confinement of a detainee are signifi-
cantly and unnecessarily inferior to those of an accused free on bail.
Thus, conditions sufficiently objectionable to violate due process
is a function of the length of time he is confined there. Statistics for 1973
indicated that 50% of newly admitted detainees stayed less that 14 days,
71.2% stayed less than 45 days, and 87.5% remained less than 120 days.
Brief for Appellant at 17, Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
43. 371 F. Supp. at 624.
44. Id. at 636. Given the Supreme Court's declaration in Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), that due process is violated by that which
"offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions
of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the
most heinous offenses." Id. at 417 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The dis-
trict court's declaration that conditions at the Tombs "would shock the
conscience of any citizen who knew of them," 371 F. Supp. at 636, seems
to be in accord with this standard. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952).
45. 507 F.2d at 339. The city did not argue that the district court's
findings of fact were "clearly erroneous." Yet, noted the circuit court, the
record was so strongly supportive of the district judge that the city could
not have done so with any success. Id. at 336.
46. 371 F. Supp. at 622.
47. 507 F.2d at 338. The argument was not made that conditions at
other detention centers within the City of New York were superior to those
at the Tombs. This showing could also serve as the basis for an equal
protection finding. The court seems to imply that an equal protection
argument would be valid only where at least one institution is superior to
the one under judicial scrutiny. Under this reasoning, given a situation
where all institutions are of similarly poor condition, equal protection




would also violate equal protection.
Plaintiffs had alleged that their eighth amendment rights4" had
also been violated.4" In a previous case,50 the Second Circuit had
expressed "considerable doubt that the . . . [eighth amendment]
is properly applicable at all until after conviction and sentence."',
In Rhem, it agreed with the district court" that although the eighth
amendment was inapplicable, "a detainee is entitled to protection
from cruel and unusual punishment as a matter of due process and,
where relevant, equal protection."5
The eighth amendment does not specifically prohibit excessive
detention.54 But it may do so by implication. Since the amendment
prohibits exce'ssive bail, and since detention is nothing more than a
substitute for bail, it can be argued that excessive detention is con-
stitutionally prohibited as well. The eighth amendment might,
therefore, be applicable to this and other cases involving pre-trial
detainees, not through the cruel and unusual punishment clause,
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
49. Some courts have so held. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d
183, 191-93 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Johnson v.
Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 301-03 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344
F. Supp. 257, 264-65 (D. Md. 1972), 363 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Md. 1973); Jones
v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99-100 (equitable order), damages
awarded, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff 'd sub nom. Jones v.
Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
50. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973).
51. Id. at 1032.
52. See 371 F. Supp. at 623-24.
53. 507 F.2d at 337. See also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisen-
stadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974), where it was held that "dealing with condi-
tions of pretrial detention, this type of case is more appropriately analyzed
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than under the
cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Eighth Amendment." Id.
at 688. See also Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 136-38 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 (equitable order),
damages awarded, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones
v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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but rather through its prohibition of excessive bail.55
Those conditions which remained uncorrected56 and which ulti-
mately led to the district court's decree enjoining the city from
further housing of detainees in the Tombs included not only prac-
tices employed by the city in operating the facility,57 but also struc-
tural deficiencies" in the building itself. Furthermore, the facility
could not be improved without the allocation of large amounts of
time and money, both of which the city claimed it did not have. 9
The district court held that the city's poverty could not excuse its
failure to remedy the constitutionally violative conditions. 0 It con-
55. See note 33 supra.
56. These conditions included the institution of a classification plan to
avoid excessive imposition of maximum security conditions, adequate pro-
vision for contact visits, increased recreation and exercise facilities, reme-
dying of excessive heat, inadequate ventilation, intolerable noise levels
(which the New York City Environmental Protection Agency found equal
to that of the city subway system, 371 F. Supp. at 628), and the absence
of transparent windows.. Id. at 600.
57. See note 56 supra. Several cases in which courts have become in-
volved in prison administration have arisen out of allegedly unconstitu-
tional practices employed by prison staff and did not concern physical
deficiencies in the prison structure itself. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438
F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972) (punitive mea-
sures taken against racial protest demonstrators); Inmates of Milwaukee
County Jail v. Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (deprivation
of privileges); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972)
(various practices); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (disciplinary procedures); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327
(M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (racial segrega-
tion); SaMarion v. McGinnis, 253 F. Supp. 738 (W.D.N.Y. 1966) (interfer-
ence with freedom of religion); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.
Ark. 1965) (corporal punishment).
58. See 371 F. Supp. at 600. To a certain extent, however, these condi-
tions were found to be a result of the imposition of maximum security. Id.
59. Brief for Appellant at 38-39, Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d
Cir. 1974). The city estimated that it would require between $17-25 million
to complete the necessary repairs, which was far in excess of what was
available under the city's current budget. No time-table could, therefore,
be provided as to when work would commence, let alone when it would be
completed. 377 F. Supp. at 1003.
60. 377 F. Supp. at 999, relying on Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), where it was held that the government's interest in avoiding an
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cluded that the protection of constitutional rights must be given
priority over other goals requiring legislative funding." The district
court had issued a decree which the city claimed it was powerless
to obey,"2 and so the constitutional rights of those detained at the
Tombs continued to be violated.A3 Only one alternative remained
-close the Tombs .
4
On appeal, the appropriateness of this remedy was brought into
question.A5 The city alleged that thirty days was too short a period
to develop the required "comprehensive and detailed plan." 6 The
court of appeals found that although the district court's March 1974
order"7 may have been too strict, the Tombs was not ordered closed
increase in its fiscal burdens was clearly outweighed by the interest of an
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipient in the uninter-
rupted receipt of public assistance benefits. Id. at 266. See also Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), where Justice, then Judge, Blackmun
stated: "Humane considerations and constitutional requirements are not,
in this day, to be measured or limited by dollar considerations ... " Id.
at 580.
61. 377 F. Supp. at 999.
62. Id. The city did not contest the court's authority to require the
submission of a plan for the alleviation of the unconstitutional conditions
at the Tombs, but nevertheless refused to do so. Id. The city constantly
stressed its willingness to comply with the court's order, yet maintained
that it was powerless to do so. It further wanted its good faith efforts, which
were found not to effect the finding of unconstitutionality, 507 F.2d at 338-
39, to be taken into consideration. Interview with Mark D. Lefkowitz,
Attorney for Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, in New York
City, Oct. 15, 1974.
63. 377 F. Supp. at 999. The district court found that, "[w]hile some
improvements have been made in the conditions which then existed, nev-
ertheless . . . the bulk of those conditions remain as they were." Id. For
example, the inmate population had been reduced from 1300 at the start
of the trial to 522 by July 11, 1974, 507 F.2d at 339 n.10, yet this did not
effect the unconstitutionality of the conditions at the Tombs.
64. 377 F. Supp. at 999. The court emphasized that the order was
subject to reconsideration and that all the city had to do to avoid this result
was to develop, within 30 days, the required plan. The court was willing
to allow the city a reasonable time to make the necessary improvements.
Id.
65. 507 F.2d at 339-40.
66. Id. at 339.
67. 377 F. Supp. at 997. The order allowed only 30 days for considera-
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until July. Even then, the city was allowed another thirty days to
make some good faith effort to comply with the original order."
Thus, "[i]f the handwriting was not yet clearly on the wall, it was
at least more than barely legible to an interested reader.""9
Because of the unusual circumstances, the substantial time and
money required to effect the necessary repairs and changes, the
location of the jail in the center of a large metropolitan area, and
the alleged financial difficulties of the city, 0 the court of appeals felt
that a more flexible remedy could be framed "to close the prison to
detainees or to limit its use for detainees to certain narrow functions
by a fixed date, unless specified standards are met."'" The court
noted that the ultimate effect of such a remedy might be much the
same as that utilized by the district court,72 but that it had the
advantage of "not putting the judge in the difficult position of trying
to enforce a direct order to the City to raise and allocate large sums
of money . . . steps traditionally left to appropriate executive and
legislative bodies responsible to the voters.""3
tion of the alternatives available to the city, which included renovation of
the Tombs, use of the Rikers Island facilities, or the construction of a new
jail. 507 F.2d at 339.
68. 507 F.2d at 339.
69. Id.
70. Brief for Appellant at 6, Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir.
1974). See note 53 supra.
71. 507 F.2d at 340. The appropriate standards or permissible limited
uses were to be established by the district court on remand. Id. The court
proposed possible alternatives. For instance, use of the Tombs might be
limited to certain specified purposes, such as initial temporary confine-
ment, or overnight housing of detainees scheduled to appear in court or
meet with their attorneys the following day. Or the Tombs might be or-
dered closed unless conditions were upgraded to meet the criteria out-
lined in the district court's opinion or if the district court felt certain that
the city could not, or would not, correct the constitutional deficiencies. Id.
at 341. However, the district court already felt certain that the city would
not, or could not, make the necessary changes. 377 F. Supp. at 999. This
indicates the circuit court's reluctance to issue a sweeping order closing the
Tombs. The court was, in effect, giving the city still another chance.
72. 507 F.2d at 340-41. In other words, the Tombs might eventually be
closed in either case.
73. Id. at 341.
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This continuing concern with maintaining judicial restraint in
prison reform has most recently been emphasized in Procunier v.
Martinez," where the prisoner mail censorship regulations of the
California Department of Corrections were held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated:
[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and,
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and
executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill
equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administra-
tion and reform."5
Both Rhem and Procunier indicate a lingering judicial reluctance to
become involved in prison reform, despite the waning of the "hands
off" doctrine. Even after intervening, the circuit court in Rhem
sought to avoid a broad and sweeping decree which might result in
a confrontation between the judiciary and the executive branch."8
In proposing a more flexible remedy, the court pointed out that
"[t]he choice of remedy . . . has tremendous implications not only
for the City but also for pre-trial detainees who may find themselves
dispersed to facilities far away from family, friends and attorneys.""
74. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
75. Id. at 404-05.
76. See also Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (N.D. Ohio
1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972);
Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (interim
order), final order entered, 358 F. Supp. 338, motion order entered, 361 F.
Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1973). In Rhem, since closing the Tombs was a
realistic alternative, the court was not faced with the awkward situation
where the facility must be kept open at all cost, which would necessitate
the court forcing the locality to appropriate the required money. 507 F.2d
at 341 n.19.
77. 507 F.2d at 341; see note 14 supra. Many of the detainees agreed
with the circuit court's decision. However, some who had been to several
of the city's detention centers said they wanted to stay at the Tombs
because it was adjacent to the Criminal Courts Building and more conven-
ient for visitors. In fact, more than 200 inmates signed a petition protesting
the closing. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 8. In this light, it is
questionable whether plaintiff class has really benefited from over four
years of litigation. 507 F.2d at 341. An attorney for the Legal Aid Society
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Had the Rikers Island institution not been available, Rhem might
stand as a stronger precedent than it does. Because of Rikers Island,
the court was able to frame a decree with it in mind, and the city
was able to effectively side-step the court's order by transferring the
Tombs population there. Thus the court was never really faced with
the problem of trying to enforce an order to close the Tombs. Had
Rikers Island not been present, both the court's remedy and the
city's response might have been significantly different. A true con-
frontation between city and judiciary might have arisen, and the
resolution thereof would have shed more light on the true power of
the federal court in prison reform."7
indicated that it once took him over 2 1/2 hours to reach Rikers Island from
Manhattan. This temporal, though not spatial, distance places severe re-
strictions on attorney-client contact as well as on prisoner-family contact,
and as such may render the Rikers Island facility unsatisfactory as an
alternative to the Tombs. Interview with Stephen A. Herman, Attorney for
the Legal Aid Society Prisoners' Rights Project, in New York City, Oct.
21, 1974. Only 14 out of 261 eligible inmates at the Tombs requested
transfers to Rikers Island under the circuit court's order staying the injunc-
tion pending appeal. See note 12 supra. The city alleged this indicated
improved conditions at the Tombs, Brief for Appellant at 37, Rhem v.
Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), but it is probably more a testament
to the unacceptability of Rikers Island. It was indicated, however, that a
federal order would be sought "to assure that conditions condemned at the
Tombs were not repeated on Rikers Island." N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1974, at
43, col. 4.
78. A recent development in the case indicates that this confrontation
may be imminent. After the Tombs was closed, plaintiffs, now at Rikers
Island, alleged that they were entitled to all the rights held to be theirs by
the circuit court, except those dealing solely with the physical conditions
at the Tombs. The city argued that the district court was without power
to grant relief to those now at Rikers Island. The district court disagreed,
however, and ruled that no new suit or trial was required. It then ordered
improvements in conditions for those prisoners transferred from the
Tombs. In particular, the district court required that within a specified
time the city must: 1) develop a classification system; 2) allow prisoners
to leave their cells at all times except for periods to count them and clean
up; 3) after the classification has been established, develop a more restric-
tive lock-in system for those requiring maximum security; 4) install in two
cell blocks an experimental system whereby prisoners are allowed to stay
in their cells during activity periods; 5) allow all prisoners contact yisits,
which may later be denied if it is determined that maximum security is
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Both courts sought to be as lenient as possible with a city beset
with countless problems."9 In spite of this sympathy, however, the
court of appeals upheld the district court's determination that mu-
nicipal poverty could not justify constitutional deprivations0 when
it concluded:
[P]re-trial detainees are people, not outcasts, who are presumed to be inno-
cent of any crime and who have rights guaranteed by the Constitution, as
do we all. When a district court is presented with a claim of violation of those
rights, its proper function is to decide the case before it, whatever sympathy
it may have for those who must manage a great metropolis beset by grievous
problems. Nor can similar considerations deflect us from the issues on ap-
peal."'
Rhem v. Malcolm thus serves as a warning to other municipalities
with constitutionally deficient prisons: clean them up or close them
down. It warns further that fiscal inability will not be accepted as
a justification for denying constitutional rights, even from a city so
large and with problems so compelling as New York. The circuit
court failed, however, to define the rights of pre-trial detainees and
the "least restrictive means '"82 of confinement. 3 The use of two
required; 6) expand the visiting schedule to allow each detainee one night
visit per week; and 7) hire more men to afford each inmate one hour of
outdoor exercise each weekday. Rhem v. Malcolm, Civil No. 70-3962
(S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 20, 1975). The ruling was severely criticized by Com-
missioner Malcolm, who charged the district court with "'interference in
the internal affairs of local government.'" The Commissioner stated that
the city does not have the money to make the necessary repairs, and
indicated that the decision would be appealed to the Supreme Court if
necessary. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1975, at 31, col. 8.
79. 507 F.2d at 341-42; 377 F. Supp. at 999.
80. 507 F.2d at 342. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
81. 507 F.2d at 342. There is no constitutional right to adequate hous-
ing provided by the government. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
However, a detainee has a constitutional right to housing in the "least
restrictive means" necessary to assure his presence at trial. See note 30
supra and accompanying text. Thus, if fiscal pressures required, a city or
state might have to suspend its public housing activities in order to assure
that conditions of detention were acceptable.
82. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
83. It had been hoped that the court would make such determinations.
Interview with Steven A. Herman, Attorney for the Legal Aid Society
Prisoners' Rights Project, in New York City, Oct. 21, 1974.
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seemingly different standards, "least restrictive means ' 8 4 and
"shock the conscience,"85 is confusing. If what exceeds the "least
restrictive means" also "shocks the conscience," the circuit court
should have so indicated; if the two tests are not the same, the
differences should have been explained."6 The circuit court's omis-
sion of specific standards may indicate that prison reform must
proceed on a case-by-case basis.
Todd L. Klipp
84. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 44 supra.
86. It would appear that the "shock the conscience" test sets a bare
minimum for constitutional tolerability. The "least restrictive means,"
however, seems to be a higher standard, more ideal and less susceptible to
definition. If this is so, one could conceive of detention which is not in the
"least restrictive means" yet does not "shock the conscience."
